We examine stock and bond price reactions to CEO equity compensation in a sample of firms where ExecuComp reports the first appearance of CEO stock option and/or restricted stock grants. For these grants, we find positive stock price reactions and negative bond price reactions. To examine the link between security holder wealth and managerial incentives, we compute the effect of these grants on the pay-performance (delta) and stock volatility (vega) sensitivities of the CEO's wealth. We find that stock price reactions are decreasing in the change in delta and increasing in the change in vega, while bond price reactions are increasing in the change in delta and decreasing in the change in vega. These relations, however, depend on the CEO's equity ownership prior to the grant. Consistent with the notion that equity-based compensation aggravates risk-shifting incentives, we find a strong negative relation between stockholder and bondholder wealth effects for grants that induce a large change in the vega of the CEO's wealth.
Introduction
The goal of equity-based compensation is to provide managers with incentives to maximize shareholder wealth. Starting with the seminal work of Jensen and Meckling (1976) , however, it is clear that equity compensation can result in a variety of unintended incentives. On the one hand, Jensen and Meckling (1976) , Brander and Poitevin (1992) , and John and John (1993) argue that equity-based compensation and especially stock options may encourage managers to adopt risky policy choices, because their compensation will be more sensitive to stock price volatility. This risk-shifting incentive presumably exacerbates stockholderbondholder conflicts. On the other hand, Lambert, Larcker and Verrecchia (1991), Carpenter (2000) , and Ross (2004) argue that a risk-averse and under-diversified manager has a strong incentive to adopt risk-reducing policy choices if her compensation has high pay-performance sensitivity. This incentive to manage too conservatively is expected to exacerbate managerstockholder conflicts.
These contrasting incentive effects of equity compensation raise a number of important questions. First, how do stockholders and bondholders react to new information about executive equity-based compensation? Although stockholder reactions to all manner of executive compensation events have been documented in the literature, there is not recent or large sample evidence on bondholder reactions. we compute stock price reactions to the new compensation event, and examine how the stock price reactions are related to the change in the pay-performance (delta) and volatility (vega) sensitivities induced by the new compensation. For a subsample of 287 events we collect bond price data from Moody's Manuals, which allows for an examination of the joint stock and bond price reactions to the new equity compensation.
Consistent with the notion that equity-based incentive compensation aligns the interests of managers and stockholders, we find positive stock price reactions surrounding the proxy filing dates for these grants. For the entire sample of 1,083 compensation events, we find mean (median) cumulative excess stock returns of 2.82% (2.15%) in the days following the proxy filing date. Importantly, we find similarly large positive excess stock returns after excluding compensation events with significant other proxy statement items and/or with significant earnings, payout, or restructuring news surrounding the proxy statement date. In sharp contrast with the positive excess stock returns, we find a negative mean (median) excess bond return of −1.12% (−0.88%) in the proxy filing period for the 287 firms for which bond prices are available.
The negative bondholder reaction suggests that new managerial incentive compensation is anticipated to aggravate stockholder-bondholder conflicts. Overall, these security price reactions are consistent with previous findings in the literature.
We then examine the important and as yet unexamined relation between these excess stock and bond returns and the change in the CEO's incentives induced by the option and/or restricted stock grants. Using the methods of Core and Guay (2002) and compensation information supplied by ExecuComp, we compute the change in the sensitivity of the CEO's wealth to stock price (delta) and stock volatility (vega) from before to after the new grants.
2 Consistent with the idea that higher pay-performance sensitivity may encourage risk-averse and under-diversified managers to forgo riskier policy choices that benefit equity, we find a negative relation between excess stock returns and the change in the delta of the CEO's wealth. This result, however, is much stronger for the subsample with bond price data (i.e., the subsample of larger firms with public debt), which suggests that the incentive to reduce risk transfers value from equity to debt. In contrast, we find a robust positive relation between excess stock returns and the change in the vega of the CEO's wealth. Interestingly, these incentive effects influence excess bond returns only when the CEO has low equity ownership prior to the new grants (i.e., when the change in delta and change in vega as a percentage of the CEO's wealth in the firm is largest). For these cases, we find that excess bond returns are increasing in the change in delta and decreasing in the change in vega.
Lastly, we examine the relation between excess stock and bond returns for evidence that incentive compensation either mitigates or, more likely, aggravates the likelihood of stockholderbondholder conflicts. Consistent with the view that equity-based compensation aggravates riskshifting incentives, we find a negative relation between stockholder and bondholder wealth effects when the new grants result in a large (e.g., above median) change in the vega of the CEO's wealth.
There is a substantial literature that examines security holder reactions to compensation events. For example, Brickley, Bhagat, and Lease (1985) and DeFusco, Johnson, and Zorn (1990) , and more recently Morgan and Poulsen (2001) and Martin and Thomas (2005) all find positive stock price reactions at the adoption of equity-based compensation plans. To our knowledge, however, only the DeFusco, Johnson, and Zorn (1990) paper examines bond price reactions to compensation events. 3 In a small sample of NYSE firms adopting executive stock option plans during the period 1978 to 1982, they find a small negative abnormal bond return around the SEC stamp date. 4 There is also a large literature that examines the feedback between managerial compensation incentives and corporate policy decisions. For example, Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006) examine the causal links between CEO compensation incentives and investment, leverage, and diversification, while Sundaram and Yermack (2007) examine how the mix of CEO compensation between debt-like and equity components (e.g., pensions versus stock options) influences the CEO's incentive to make conservative policy choices.
Our study makes several contributions to this literature. First, this is the first study to document the relations between security holder reactions to compensation events and the payperformance (delta) and volatility (vega) incentives induced by the compensation. These links are important, because it has never been shown that stockholder and bondholder reactions to compensation events are associated with the specific incentives provided by the compensation.
Second, this is the first study to provide evidence that the differential reactions of stockholders and bondholders to compensation events are associated with the exacerbated risk-shifting incentives induced by high-vega compensation. Finally, our study updates and provides large sample evidence of bondholder reactions to compensation events.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops testable predictions. We discuss our data in Section 3 and our results in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
Predictions
In general, we expect stockholders to react positively to information about new executive compensation that aligns manager-shareholder interests. We therefore expect positive stock 3 There is some recent empirical work that documents a positive relation between bond credit spreads and managerial stock ownership (see Ortiz-Molina (2006) ), and between bond credit spreads and the incentive characteristics (delta and vega) of CEO compensation contracts (see Daniel, Martin, and Naveen (2004) ). 4 Prior to electronic filing, the SEC stamp date was the date when the SEC mailroom opened the proxy and marked it received. The average abnormal bond return for 26 firms with debt traded on the SEC stamp day and the day before are −0.38% and −0.40%, respectively.
price reactions surrounding compensation events where the CEO position receives significant and new equity-based compensation. In contrast, it is perhaps less clear how bondholders will react to new managerial equity compensation. On the one hand, enhanced manager-shareholder alignment may increase stockholder-bondholder conflicts. Specifically, since equity has limited liability, it is well known that stockholders have an incentive to risk-shift at the expense of bondholders. Since managers control the day-to-day decisions of the firm, this risk-shifting problem is kept in check when their compensation is relatively insensitive to the stock price. As managerial compensation is tilted more toward equity, it is easy to see that maximizing shareholder wealth can lead to enhanced risk-shifting incentives. As such, rational bondholders should price these incentive effects into the firm's debt, and we would therefore predict a negative bondholder reaction. On the other hand, this negative effect could be offset if the anticipated riskier policy choices also increase expected cash flows. Since risky debt will benefit from higher expected cash flows, the resulting net bondholder reaction could be positive.
Importantly, however, stockholder and bondholder reactions should depend on how the new compensation influences a CEO's incentives. The heightened incentive to purse risky policies is predicated on the assumption that the new compensation significantly increases the sensitivity of the CEO's overall wealth to own-firm stock price volatility. Obviously, this is more likely if the CEO receives a significant amount of at-the-money stock option grants, but is much less likely if the new compensation is restricted stock. Indeed, as originally illustrated by Lambert, Larcker, and Verrecchia (1991) , a risk-averse manager with a large proportion of her wealth tied up in the equity of the firm may actually eschew risk. Subsequent analysis by
Carpenter (2000) and Ross (2004) illustrates this same risk-avoidance incentive when the payperformance sensitivity of the manager's compensation is high (e.g., when the manager has deep-in-the-money options).
We therefore compute how new CEO equity compensation changes the pay-performance (delta) and volatility (vega) sensitivities of a CEO's wealth, and then relate these sensitivities to the security price reactions to the compensation. We assume that the larger the change in vega, the more likely the CEO will purse riskier policy choices; and that the larger the change in delta, the more likely the CEO will purse more conservative policy choices. To link these compensation incentives to security price reactions, we adopt the contingent-claims view of equity and debt that all else being equal, equity value is increasing in risk and risky debt value is decreasing in risk. We therefore predict that the stock price reaction to new CEO equity compensation will be increasing in the change in vega of the CEO's wealth and decreasing in the change in the delta of the CEO's wealth. In contrast, we predict that the bond price reaction to an increase in vega will be negative, whereas the bond price reaction to an increase in delta will be positive. We note, however, that these predictions implicitly assume that risk-changing policy choices are not also accompanied by significant changes in expected cash flow; otherwise, for example, it could be possible that risky policy choices benefit both equity and debt if they result in higher expected cash flows. We also note that these predictions may depend on the size of the CEO's portfolio of own-firm stock prior to the new equity compensation event. For example, new equity compensation that induces a large change in the vega of the CEO's portfolio holdings may have more (or less) impact depending on whether the CEO has small or large own-firm equity holdings prior to the compensation event. We investigate this possibility in our empirical analysis.
Lastly, we examine the relation between the stock and bond price reactions to new CEO equity compensation events. If high vega compensation encourages the CEO to adopt riskier policies choices, then part of the gains to stockholders may be attributable to a wealth transfer from bondholders. Alternatively, if high delta compensation encourages the CEO to pursue more conservative policy choices, then all else being equal, we might expect a wealth transfer from stockholders to bondholders. Thus, regardless of the direction of the CEO risk incentives induced by the compensation, we would expect a negative relation between the stock and bond price reactions to the compensation.
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An important issue for any study on the valuation consequences of equity compensation is the phenomenon of stock option back-dating documented by Lie (2005) . For a large proportion of CEO option grants, Lie finds that the actual grant dates are prior to the proxy filing dates where the grants are first publicly disclosed. 6 More troublesome, the actual grant dates tend to coincide with low points in firms' recent stock price histories, so that proxy filing dates tend to be preceded by superior risk-adjusted stock price performance and the stock options are in-the-money when publicly disclosed. 7 This suggests that stock price reactions around proxy filing dates may be positive regardless of whether the disclosed CEO equity compensation has any real influence on corporate policy choices. Furthermore, CEO option grants will tend to have larger deltas and smaller vegas, because the stock options will be in-the-money when viewed at the proxy filing date.
Although positive stock price bias induced by back-dating is an important caveat for our analysis, back-dating works against our predictions for the relation between stock price reactions and the associated changes in the delta and vega of the CEO's wealth. The reason is that backdating appears to hard-wire a positive relation between the stock price reaction and the change in delta and hard-wire a negative relation between the stock price reaction and the change in vega.
However, the compensation incentive story predicts the opposite (i.e., a negative relation for delta and a positive relation for vega), and so any hard-wire bias will work against our predictions. In contrast, it is somewhat ambiguous how back-dating influences bondholder outcomes, since it is far less clear whether stock option back-dating will produce a pattern of subsequent superior risk-adjusted performance for a firm's bonds. If it did, contrary to predictions, we would anticipate finding a positive relation between bond and stock price reactions to new CEO compensation disclosed on proxy filing dates.
6 Option back-dating is not a problem for grants awarded after August 2002. As discussed by Heron and Lie (2007) , effective August 29, 2002 the SEC requires executives to report option grants on Form 4 within 2 business days after they are granted. 7 Note that stock options are virtually always granted at-the-money. Since stock option grants are back-dated to a low point in a firm's stock price, they will tend to be in-the-money when the public learns about the options at the proxy filing date.
Data and Descriptive Statistics

Sample Construction
We person who happens to hold the CEO position, since we require no option and/or restricted stock grants to whomever holds the title of CEO in prior years. Our methods yield a sample of 1,686
CEO firm-years with a first appearance of stock option and/or restricted stock grants.
It is important to note that our sample selection procedures do not rule out CEO stock holdings prior to these grants, nor do they rule out cases where the CEO position has been receiving other equity-based grants. For example, our sample can include the first time that a firm compensates the CEO position with restricted stock, despite having a long history of giving option grants to their top executives. Thus, as we note below, the CEOs in our sample have a nontrivial amount of own-firm equity holdings prior to these grants. Nevertheless, the primary benefit of our approach is that it increases the chances of identifying significant CEO 'compensation events' for a large sample of firms. Since we are also interested in bondholder reactions to the grants, we identify the subsample of the 1,083 event sample that has bond price data. We start by requiring that in the year of the proxy filing date, the sum of the firm's long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities 12 The Form 4 date is a potentially important date for grants after August 2002, since effective August 29, 2002, executives are required to report grants to the SEC on Form 4 within 2 business days, and the SEC publicly discloses this information one day later (see, e.g., Heron and Lie (2007)). We gather Form 4 filing dates from the SEC's online Edgar database.
is nonzero and that the firm has a bond rating. These restrictions reduce the sample to 566
observations. For this subsample, we then hand collect monthly bond price data from
Moody's/Mergent Bond Record. 13 We require that Moody's/Mergent reports bid or sale prices for at least one nonconvertible note or debenture for the three-month period from one month before to one month after the proxy filing month, and for a similar three-month period around the For this subsample of 287 first time option and/or restricted stock grants, we use the SEC's Edgar database and LexisNexis to collect the proxy statements containing the first appearance of option and/or restricted stock grants. We read the proxy statements in search of annual meeting agenda items, which along with the new equity compensation, may similarly influence security returns. Among the standard items (e.g., election of directors and appointment of auditor), we identify four that may reasonably impact security returns. These include management proposals to change the structure of the board of directors, change the number of authorized shares, change from single-class to dual-class shares, and change the voting procedures. We code a firm as having (significant other) proxy statement news if the firm's proxy statement contains any of these items.
We also use Factiva (a Dow Jones & Reuters news database) to collect information on earnings, payout, and restructuring news in the proxy filing month and the following month. A firm is coded as having positive earnings news if there is an earnings announcement during this time period that is above consensus estimates, and negative earnings news if there is an earnings announcement that is below consensus estimates. A firm is coded as having positive payout news if it announces an increase in dividends or share repurchases during this time period, and negative payout news if it announces a decrease in dividends. Finally, a firm is coded as having restructuring news if it announces any type of restructuring event during this time period. We use these codes to check the robustness of our results by filtering out the influence of these information events on security holder reactions to compensation events. firm-years with option grants increases from 50% at the beginning of the sample period to over 80% by the end of the sample period. Note also that the incidence of restricted stock, although less frequent than that of options, has almost tripled over the sample period (from 15% to 43%).
Descriptive Statistics
Panel A of Table 2 This is not surprising given that the Stock and Bond Event Sample is comprised of firms with public debt outstanding. There is no difference, however, in the return on assets for the various samples. When the event samples are grouped by type of new equity compensation (not reported in the table), we find little difference between firms adopting option grants and firms adopting restricted stock grants. Although restricted stock firms tend to be larger (significantly so at the median), they are not significantly different from option granting firms on any other firm characteristic.
The remainder of Panel A reports descriptive statistics for the CEO's cash compensation (salary plus bonus), pay-performance (delta) and volatility (vega) incentives, and the pre-grant value of her stock holdings, for the various samples. Delta grant is the change in the value of the CEO's option and/or restricted stock grants for a 1% change in the stock price. Vega grant is the change in the value of the option component of the grants for a 0.01 change in the annualized standard deviation of stock returns. The delta and vega computations follow the methods in Core and Guay (2002), who use the dividend-adjusted version of the Black-Scholes model to compute the value of executive stock options. 16 We also follow Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006) Note that it might be possible for a CEO receiving a new option and/or restricted stock grant to alter or even undo the delta and vega incentives of the grant by decreasing any pre-grant holdings of the firm's stock. Therefore, to capture the marginal effect of the new grant on CEO incentives we compute the change in the delta and vega of the CEO's wealth from the year prior to the grant to the year of the grant. 17 The change in delta is computed as the delta of the CEO's wealth in the year of the grant minus the delta of the CEO's wealth in the year prior to the grant, where the delta of the CEO's wealth is the change in the value of the option and/or restricted stock grants, share holdings, and any pre-grant restricted stock or option holdings for a 1% change in the stock price. The change in vega is computed as the vega of the CEO's wealth in the year of the grant minus the vega of the CEO's wealth in the year prior to the grant, where the vega of the CEO's wealth is the change in the value of the option grant and any pre-grant option 16 Numerous authors note that the Black-Scholes model overvalues executive stock options since it does not account for the fact that such options are non-tradable and are held by under-diversified and risk-averse executives. Our results, however, are robust when we calculate delta and vega using the certainty-equivalence framework of Lambert, Larcker, and Verrecchia (1991) , Hall and Murphy (2002), and Cai and Vijh (2005) , or the marginal value framework of Ingersoll (2006) . 17 Note that these delta and vega changes are computed for the CEO position, and so the change in the delta and the vega of a CEO's wealth can be based on two different individuals if the CEO in the year prior to the grant is different from the CEO in the year of the grant. However, this occurs relatively infrequently in our event samples. Finally, Panel B reports descriptive statistics for variables specific to the Stock and Bond Event Sample. As seen there, the average/median maturity of the debt instrument used to measure the bondholder reaction to the new compensation is around 10 years, and a nontrivial fraction (37%) are below investment grade. Also note that a nontrivial proportion of the sample has other information events in the time period immediately surrounding the proxy filing date.
Thus, for example, 20% have positive earnings new, 8% have major restructuring news, and 13% have significant other proxy statement items in addition to the new equity compensation. We can check the robustness of our results by controlling for these news events.
Results
We report results for the sample of CEO firm-years with bond price data (i.e. the Stock and Bond Event Sample) and for the larger sample of CEO firm-years with only stock return data. The key limitation of the Stock and Bond Event Sample is that reliable bond price data is only available at a monthly frequency. Thus, we initially report stockholder and bondholder reactions to compensation events using monthly excess returns. We then examine stockholder reactions for all event samples using daily excess stock returns. This is followed by an examination of how the change in CEO delta and vega incentives induced by the new grants influence excess stock returns, and for the subsample with bond prices, excess bond returns.
Lastly, we examine the relation between the excess stock and bond returns.
Excess Returns
We first compute monthly stock and bond excess returns for each firm in the Stock and prior to the proxy filing date (11 grants), the excess return is the sum of the four monthly excess returns around the Form 4 date (months 0 and +1) and the proxy filing date (months 0 and +1);
and if the Form 4 date is one month prior to the proxy filing date (10 grants), the excess return is the sum of the three monthly excess returns around the Form 4 date (month 0) and the excess returns around the proxy filing date (months 0 and +1).
We include the month following the proxy filing month (and where possible the Form 4 month) in our reported excess returns for several reasons. First, announcement dates for executive compensation grants are ambiguous (see, e.g., Murphy (1999) observe that when the sample is grouped into below investment grade and investment grade firms, bondholder excess returns are more negative in the below investment grade group, but the mean and median differences between the two groups are not statistically significant. The positive stockholder reaction suggests that significant new option and/or restricted stock compensation helps to focus the CEO on equity value maximization, whereas the negative bondholder reaction suggests that bondholders anticipate greater agency conflicts. Note that although the positive stock price reaction could have been anticipated given prior event study evidence, the only other evidence on bondholder reactions to compensation events is the negative average reaction of 26 bonds to executive stock option plans during 1978 -1982 documented in DeFusco, Johnson, and Zorn (1990 . It is interesting to note that bondholders' negative perception of executive equity compensation has not changed over the last 30 years.
Although not reported in the table, we also compute the combined excess stock and bond return to estimate the influence of new executive equity compensation on overall firm value.
The combined excess return is computed as a weighted average, where the weights are based on the market value of equity and the book value of long-term debt. For the option and restricted stock sample, the mean (median) combined excess stock and bond return is 1.05% (1.41%), which is significant at the 10 percent level (1 percent level). Thus, despite the losses to bondholders that we document, the overall effect of incentive compensation on firm value is positive.
Notice in Panel A that there is little difference in the excess stock and bond returns when the sample is grouped by first appearance of CEO option grants and first appearance of CEO restricted stock grants. 22 The mean excess stock and bond returns for the option grant group are 2.49% and −1.31%, and the mean excess stock and bond returns for the restricted stock grant group are 2.56% and −1.02%. This symmetry in stock and bond reactions is perhaps unexpected, since one might expect that the convex structure of option compensation engenders 22 We include 9 observations where the CEO receives option and restricted stock grants in both partitions of the sample. Our conclusions are the same if instead we exclude these overlapping observations. 23 We also compute excess stock and bond returns for all categories in Table 3 for a subset of 184 firms where
ExecuComp reports the first appearance of option and/or restricted stock grants for all of a firm's top executives. The excess stock and bond returns for these firms (not reported) are similar to those reported in Table 3 . The only noticeable difference is that the excess returns when all top executives receive new equity compensation tend to be larger in absolute value than when only the CEO receives new equity compensation. These differences, however, do not appear to be economically significant and are not statistically significant.
longer time horizons after the proxy date. For example, over the period [0, +30] , the median cumulative daily excess stock returns are 2.31%, 2.71%, and 2.47% for the stock and bond, stock only, and combined samples, respectively. This finding of positive excess stock returns over fairly long time horizons after the proxy date is consistent with the arguments in the literature (e.g., Murphy (1999) ) that it is hard to pin down the precise date(s) when the market learns the specifics about new managerial compensation. Table 5 reports regressions of excess stock and bond returns on the change in the CEO's pay-performance (delta) and risk (vega) incentives for the Stock and Bond Event Sample. In the regressions, ΔDelta and ΔVega are the change in the delta and the change in the vega of the CEO's wealth from the year before to the year of the proxy statement reporting the new grants.
Excess Returns and CEO Delta and Vega Incentives
The other variables included in the regressions control for news around the proxy filing date and firm characteristics. Thus, earnings news equals 1 for earnings announcements around the proxy filing month that are above consensus estimates, −1 for earnings announcements below consensus estimates, and 0 otherwise; payout news equals 1 if the firm announces a dividend increase or share repurchase around the proxy filing month, −1 if the firm announces a dividend decrease, and 0 otherwise; restructuring news is a dummy variable equal to 1 if there is a restructuring event around the proxy filing month, and 0 otherwise; and proxy news is a dummy variable equal to 1 if there are significant other management proposals in the proxy statement, and 0 otherwise. The firm characteristic variables included in the regressions are defined in Recall the predictions that excess stock returns should be negatively related to ΔDelta and positively related to ΔVega. The reason is that an increase in delta should encourage risk-averse and under-diversified CEOs to implement lower risk policies, and an increase in vega should encourage riskier policies. All else being equal, equityholders are expected to react more favorably to incentive compensation that encourages riskier policies. In contrast, bondholders should react favorably to high delta compensation that encourages more conservative policies and negatively to high vega compensation that encourages greater risk-taking, but as we noted earlier, these predictions assume that any change in risk is not accompanied by a change in expected cash flows. Thus, it is less certain whether excess bond returns should be positively related to ΔDelta and negatively related to ΔVega.
Consistent with the predictions for equity, observe in specification (1) that excess stock returns are significantly decreasing in ΔDelta and significantly increasing in ΔVega.
Importantly, these results document a direct link between the value of equity and the change in both the CEO's pay-performance and risk incentives induced by the new equity grants. These effects are highly economically significant. Using the coefficient estimates in (1), a one standard deviation increase in ΔDelta decreases excess stock returns by 2.69 percentage points (i.e., from a mean of 2.56% to −0.13%), and a one standard deviation increase in ΔVega increases excess stock returns by 2.39 percentage points (i.e., from a mean of 2.56% to 4.95%).
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Notice in specification (2) that excess bond returns are not related to either ΔDelta or ΔVega. This finding, however, depends on the pre-grant own-firm stock holdings of the CEO.
Defining LOW as a dummy variable equal to one if the pre-grant value of the CEO's stock holdings is in the lowest quartile of the sample and zero otherwise, specifications (3) and (4) in Table 5 report excess stock and bond return regressions that include the interacted variables ΔDelta × LOW and ΔVega × LOW. We also report stock and bond specifications in (5) and (6) where we replace ΔDelta with ΔDelta × LOW and ΔDelta × (1 − LOW), and ΔVega with ΔVega × LOW and ΔVega × (1 − LOW).
25
24 Note in the regressions that the excess stock and bond returns are in percent, and ΔDelta and ΔVega are in millions. 25 The regression results are similar but less significant if instead we use the median of the CEOs' pre-grant stock holdings to define LOW. Note in specifications (3)-(6) that we do not separately include LOW in the regressions, which imposes the restriction of a common intercept for LOW = 1 and LOW = 0 groups. Our results are unchanged if instead we include LOW as a separate regressor (i.e., allow the two groups to have different intercepts).
Observe in specification (4) that ΔDelta has a significantly more positive effect on excess bond returns and ΔVega has a significantly more negative effect on excess bond returns when the CEO has little or no pre-grant equity ownership (i.e., the coefficient on ΔDelta × LOW is positive and the coefficient on ΔVega × LOW is negative). Indeed, note in specification (6) that
ΔDelta and ΔVega only influence excess bond returns when LOW = 1, and for these firms the effect of ΔDelta on excess bond returns is positive while the effect of ΔVega on excess bond returns is negative. The economic significance of these relations can be illustrated using the coefficients on ΔDelta × LOW and ΔVega × LOW in specification (6). Thus for CEOs with little or no pre-grant equity ownership, a one standard deviation increase in ΔDelta increases excess bond returns by 3.14 percentage points and a one standard deviation increase in ΔVega decreases excess bond returns by 2.98 percentage points. Overall, it appears that bondholders are quite sensitive to the change in CEO pay-performance and risk-taking incentives when the CEO has little or no equity ownership prior to the new equity grants.
Note in specifications (3) and (5) that the negative effect of ΔDelta on excess stock returns and the positive effect of ΔVega on excess stock returns are not true for firms where the CEO has little or no pre-grant equity ownership (i.e., LOW = 1). For these firms (the quartile of the sample with the lowest CEO pre-grant stock ownership), ΔDelta has a positive effect on excess stock returns and ΔVega has a negative effect on excess stock returns. Although it would be tempting to tell stories about why these relations are not consistent with the predicted effects documented for the full sample in specification (1), the coefficients on ΔDelta and ΔVega for the observations where LOW = 1 are not statistically different from zero.
Panel A of Table 6 compensation. The size match is based on assets and the industry match is based on the narrowest SIC code (starting with four digits) that yields a match. Although we only report the coefficients on ΔDelta and ΔVega, the regressions are estimated with all of the firm control variables used in Table 5 .
As seen in Panel A of Table 6 , the results using daily excess stock returns and much larger samples of first time compensation events are quite similar to those reported in Table 5 for the monthly excess returns of the Stock and Bond Event Sample. In particular, five of the six coefficients on ΔVega are significantly positive and all of the coefficients on ΔDelta are negative, though they are not statistically significant. 26 In contrast, the signs of the coefficients on ΔDelta and ΔVega in the control sample regressions vary and are never statistically significant. Finally, note in Panel B of Table 6 that the coefficients on ΔDelta and ΔVega in the event samples tend to be economically significant. For example, in the Combined Event Sample and using a daily excess stock return window of [0, +22], a one standard deviation increase in ΔDelta decreases excess stock returns by 0.67 percentage points, and a one standard deviation increase in ΔVega increases excess stock returns by 1.11 percentage points.
Relation between Stock and Bond Price Reactions to Incentive Compensation
Lastly, we examine the relation between the excess returns to stockholders and bondholders. Our results suggest that at least part of the gains to stockholders from new equitybased CEO incentive compensation may come at the expense of bondholders. If true, this would be consistent with the agency theoretic analyses in Brander and Poitevan (1992) and John and John (1993) , which predict a negative relation between the change in the market value of equity and the change in the market value of debt when the CEO's compensation tilts toward equity-based incentive compensation. Importantly, the strength of this relation should be sensitive to the change in the vega of the CEO's wealth induced by the new grant, since vega can be viewed as a proxy for potential stockholder-bondholder conflicts to the extent that higher vega compensation encourages the CEO to pursue riskier policies.
27 Table 7 reports regressions of excess stock dollar returns on excess bond dollar returns for the Stock and Bond Event Sample (N = 287) with and without conditioning on the change in the vega of the CEO's wealth. 28 The excess stock and bond dollar returns are computed by multiplying the monthly excess stock and bond returns by the market value of equity and the book value of long-term debt, respectively. 29 We use the market value of equity one month prior to the proxy filing month, and the book value of long-term debt at the fiscal year end immediately prior to the proxy filing month.
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Although we do not report the coefficient estimates, all of the regressions include the information and accounting controls used in the regressions reported in Table 5 . The regression coefficient t-statistics are computed using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.
Specification (1) in Table 7 estimates the unconditional relation between the excess stock and bond dollar returns. As seen in the table, the coefficient on the excess bond dollar return is significantly negative, which is consistent with the prediction that part of the gains to stockholders from new CEO equity compensation are transfers of wealth from bondholders. 27 Note that the relation between stockholder and bondholder excess returns could also be influenced by the change in the delta of the CEO's wealth induced by the new grant. In unreported analysis, however, we find no evidence that the change in delta influences the relation between stockholder and bondholder excess returns. 28 We purposely do not scale the excess dollar returns to avoid hard-wiring the relation between the equity and bond price reactions. In particular, scaling the excess dollar returns by an estimate of firm value is tantamount to regressing the excess equity return multiplied by one minus the leverage ratio on the excess bond return multiplied by the leverage ratio, which clearly biases the estimated relation. We recognize, however, that regressing dollar excess stock returns on dollar excess bond returns is likely to produce heteroskedastic regression residuals. As noted below, the regressions reported in Table 7 attempt to correct for this problem. 29 The excess bond dollar return is an approximation of the firm's overall debt reaction, since we only use one of a firm's long-term debt instruments to compute the excess bond return. For the 287 firms in the sample, the mean (median) ratio of the book value of the debt instrument used to compute the excess bond return to the book value of the firm's total long-term debt is 0.69 (0.20), which suggests that the approximation may be reasonable. 30 For the 21 observations after August 2002 where the Form 4 filing month is prior to the proxy filing month, we use the market value of equity one month prior to the Form 4 month and the book value of long-term debt at the fiscal year-end immediately prior to the Form 4 month.
Note that since the absolute value of the coefficient estimate on the excess bond dollar return is less than one, it is clear that factors besides wealth transfers influence the stock and bond excess dollar returns. Thus, the estimated coefficient on excess bond dollar returns in (1) indicates that a $1 decrease in the excess bond dollar return increases the excess stock dollar return by $0.25.
Specifications (2) and (3) condition the relation on vega, using a dummy variable, HighΔVega, that is equal to one if the change in the vega of the CEO's wealth induced by the new grant is above the sample median, and zero otherwise. As seen in specification (2), the coefficient on the interaction of excess bond dollar returns and HighΔVega is significantly negative, which indicates that the relation between excess stock and bond dollar returns is significantly more negative when the change in vega is above the sample median. Specification (3) separately estimates the relation between excess stock and bond dollar returns for above and below median change in vega. As seen there, the relation is significantly negative for above median change in vega (coefficient = −0.32), and is significantly positive for below median change in vega (coefficient = 0.17). This illustrates that the negative relation between excess stock and bond dollar returns in (1) is driven by those cases where the new equity compensation is anticipated to have the largest influence on the CEO's incentive to choose risky policies. In contrast, the positive coefficient on excess bond dollar returns for below median change in vega suggests that new equity compensation is anticipated to be beneficial to both equity and debt when CEO incentives to risk-shift are muted.
Conclusions
This paper examines stock and bond price reactions to the first appearance of option and/or restricted stock grants to CEOs during the period from 1992 to 2005. We find positive excess stock returns and negative excess bond returns around the proxy filing date reporting the details of the new grants. The divergent stock and bond price reactions are consistent with the notion that equity based compensation helps align manager-shareholder interests, and that doing so aggravates stockholder-bondholder conflicts. We then document the important linkages between the excess stock and bond returns and the changes in the CEO's pay-performance (delta) and risk-taking (vega) incentives induced by the new grants. Consistent with the predictions that high delta compensation can induce excessive managerial conservatism while high vega compensation can encourage risky policy choices, we find that excess stock returns are decreasing in the change in delta and increasing in the change in vega. In contrast, when the CEO has little or no own-firm stock holdings prior to the grant, we find that excess bond returns are increasing in the change in delta and decreasing in the change in vega. Finally, we document that dollar excess stock and bond returns are negatively related when stockholder-bondholder conflicts are likely to be more severe. Overall, the key contribution of our paper is that we are the first to establish direct links between equity and debt values and the incentives provided by equity based managerial compensation. Table 1 First
Appearance of Option and Restricted Stock Grants for CEOs in the ExecuComp Database by Proxy Filing Year for Various Samples
The three event samples are proxy filing years identified as the first appearance of CEO option and/or restricted stock grants over the period from 1992 to 2005. The Stock and Bond Event Sample is the subsample of cases where we have both stock and bond returns at the proxy filing date, the Stock Only Event Sample is the subsample of cases where we only have stock returns on the proxy filing date, and the Combined Event Sample is the sum of the two subsamples. The "All" sample includes firm-years on ExecuComp where the CEO receives new, continuing (i.e., not new) or no option and/or restricted stock grants, and where CEO, stock return and accounting data are available in the ExecuComp, CRSP, and Compustat databases. Note that for a given sample the option and restricted stock percentages in a given year need not sum to 100 percent, because there are cases where a CEO receives both option and restricted stock grants. . A CEO's cash compensation ($ thousands) is computed as salary plus bonus. Delta grant is the dollar change ($ thousands) in the value of the option and/or restricted stock grants for a 1% change in the stock price. Vega grant is the dollar change ($ thousands) in the value of the option grant for a 0.01 change in the annualized standard deviation of stock returns. Change in delta ($ thousands) is the delta of the CEO's wealth in the year of the option and/or restricted stock grants minus the delta of the CEO's wealth in the year prior to the grants, where the delta of the CEO's wealth is the dollar change in the value of the option and/or restricted stock grants, share holdings, and any restricted stock and option holdings for a 1% change in the stock price. Change in vega ($ thousands) is the vega of the CEO's wealth in the year of the option and/or restricted stock grants minus the vega of the CEO's wealth in the year prior to the grants, where the vega of the CEO's wealth is the dollar change in the value of the option grant and any option holdings for a 0.01 change in the annualized standard deviation of stock returns. Option delta and vega are computed using the dividend-adjusted Black-Scholes model. Pre-grant value of CEO stock holdings ($ millions) is the dollar value of existing stock holdings (including any restricted stock) plus the dollar value of any options. The Panel B variables are defined as follows. Maturity is the remaining maturity of the firm's bond that is used to compute the bondholder excess return. A firm is below investment grade if its Moody's (S&P) bond rating is below BAA (BBB-). A firm has positive (negative) earnings news if there is an earnings announcement in the proxy month or the month following the proxy month that is above (below) consensus estimates. A firm has positive (negative) payout news if it announces an increase (decrease) in dividends in the proxy filing month or the month following the proxy filing month. A firm has restructuring news if there is any type of restructuring event announced in the proxy filing month or the month following the proxy filing month. A firm has proxy statement news if the proxy statement has any management proposals involving change in board structure, change in authorized shares, allowance for dual-class shares, or change in voting procedures. Table  3 for computational details. Except where noted below, all independent variables are defined in Table 2 . ΔDelta (ΔVega) is the change in the delta (vega) of the CEO's wealth from the year before to the year of the grant. LOW is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the pre-grant value of the CEO's stock holdings is in the lowest quartile of the sample, and 0 otherwise. Earnings news equals 1 (−1) for earnings announcements in the proxy month or the following month that are above (below) consensus estimates, and 0 for no earnings news. Payout news equals 1 (−1) if the firm announces an increase (decrease) in dividends in the proxy month or the following month, and 0 for no dividend news. Restructuring news is a dummy variable equal to 1 if there is a restructuring event in the proxy month or the following month, and 0 otherwise. Proxy news is a dummy variable equal to 1 if there are significant other management proposals in the proxy statement, and 0 otherwise. All continuous independent variables are winsorized at the 1 st and 99 th percentiles, and all dollar values are CPI-adjusted to 2004 dollars. Heteroskedasticity consistent t-statistics are reported in parentheses below the parameter estimates. We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Table 6 Regressions
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________________________
of Daily Excess Stock Returns on CEO Incentives for Event and Control Samples
Panel A reports regression coefficients for the Stock and Bond Event Sample (N = 287), the Equity Only Event Sample (N = 796), and the Combined Event Sample (N = 1,083) when the dependent variable is the cumulative daily excess stock return over the window [0, +22] or [0, +30] , where day 0 is the proxy filing date. For each event sample, the panel also reports regression coefficients for a matching control sample where CEOs do not receive new equity compensation. The control samples are generated by matching each firm in the event sample (287 + 796) to a size-and industry-matched firm in the sample of 17,238 firm-years where the CEO does not receive new equity compensation. The size match is based on assets and the industry match is based on the narrowest possible SIC code (starting with four digits) that yields a match. Although we only report the coefficients on ΔDelta and ΔVega, the regressions are estimated with all of the accounting control variables used in Table 5 . Panel B reports the change in the excess stock returns for a one standard deviation increase in ΔDelta and ΔVega. We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Table 7 Regressions of Excess Stock Dollar Returns on Excess Bond Dollar Returns
The regressions are estimated using excess stock and bond dollar returns ($ millions) for the sample of 287 firms where ExecuComp reports the first appearance of option and/or restricted stock grants to their CEOs. The excess stock dollar return is computed as the excess stock return multiplied by the market value of equity one month prior to the proxy filing month (or Form 4 month for 21 observations after August 2002 where the Form 4 date is earlier than the proxy filing date). The excess bond dollar return is computed as the excess bond return multiplied by the book value of longterm debt at the fiscal year-end immediately prior to the proxy filing month (or Form 4 month for 21 observations after August 2002 where the Form 4 date is earlier than the proxy filing date). The computation of the excess stock and bond returns are described in Table 3 . The variable HighΔVega is a dummy variable equal to one if the change in the vega of the CEO's wealth (ΔVega) induced by the new grant is above the sample median, and zero otherwise. Although we only report coefficients on key variables, the regressions are estimated with all of the control variables used in Table 5 . Heteroskedasticity consistent t-statistics are reported in parentheses below the parameter estimates. We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
